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I. INTRODUCTION
Although in recent years there has been legislative movement both to
remove the great bulk of civil disabilities of ex-offenders' and to prohibit
employment discrimination based solely on the existence of a prior
criminal record, = the present system still presents a myriad of legal and
practical impediments to ex-offenders in search of employment. This
article examines the plight of the released ex-offender who has
employment skills to sell but who faces employers neither willing nor
needing to buy. It evaluates several attempts to correct this situation and
focuses on the solution proposed in the Model Sentencing and Corrections
Act that offers the most promise of enhanced employment opportunities
for ex-offenders.
II. REALISTIC EMPLOYMENT FOR CONFINED OFFENDERS: A NEW GOAL
In 1978 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws adopted the Model Sentencing and Corrections Act.3 The Act
governs the treatment of offenders4 from initial sentencing to sentence
discharge. A significant underpinning of the Act is the rejection of
rehabilitation as a goal in determining either the nature or duration of the
sentence5 or in compelling participation by offenders in programs of self-
1. See, e.g., NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS [NCCUSL],
MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT § 4-1001 (1978) [hereinafter cited as MSCA] and text at
notes 25-30 and 35 infra.
2. See text accompanying notes 150-63 infra (describing direct relationship test of ex-offender
employment discrimination legislation).
3. The Model Act was the culmination of a three-year drafting project covering 17 meetings of
the Special Committee to Draft the Sentencing and Corrections Act and producing two precursor
annual drafts of the Act. The First and Second Tentative Drafts were presented for interim review and
comments to the National Conference at the 1976 and 1977 annual meetings. At the times of both
presentations the Act was referred to as the Uniform Corrections Act. The title was expanded to
Sentencing and Corrections Act in order to reflect more accurately its scope. After consideration of
Conference criteria governing uniform and model acts, the National Conference voted formally in
August of 1978 to approve the Sentencing and Corrections Act as a model rather than a uniform Act.
Discussion of that decision is found at 2 NCCUSL, PROCEEDINGS IN COMMITrEE OF THE WHOLE TO
DISCUSS THE UNIFORM SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT 473-74 (July 30-31, 1978). For a general
summary of provisions of the Model Act and a description of the drafting process, see Perlman &
Potuto, The Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Sentencing and Corrections Act: An Overview, 58
NEB. L. REV. 925 (1979).
4. In the Model Sentencing and Corrections Act, "offender" refers to all sentenced persons
whether incarcerated or not. MSCA, supra note 1, § 1-101(8). The class of incarcerated persons,
denominated "confined persons" under the Act, includes offenders as well as pretrial detainees and
material witnesses. Id. § 1-101(2). A confined offender, therefore, is a convicted person sentenced to a
term of incarceration.
5. MSCA, supra note 1, § 3-102. The one exception is that the length of a term of community
supervision (probation) may relate to the time necessary to complete a rehabilitation program in which
participation by the offender was made a condition of the sentence. Id. § 3-102(5). The sentencing
provisions of the Model Act are contained in Article 3 (Sentencing). The Act describes a presumptive
sentencing scheme through use of a statutorily created Sentencing Commission (§ 3-110) charged with
establishing guideline sentences (§§ 3-112 to 3-114) consistent with the principles and purposes of
sentencing (§ 3-115) as defined by the Act (§§ 3-101, 3-102). The basic purposes of the sentencing
scheme established by the Act are punishment, the elimination of unjustified disparity, and promotion
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betterment.6 The Act is, however, structured to encourage voluntary
7
participation by confined offenders in the wide variety of rehabilitative
programs and opportunities to be made available under the Act.8 It is
anticipated that the rehabilitative potential of those programs will be
increased by "giving offenders a greater voice in, and accordingly a greater
incentive for, their own self-improvement." 9 Central among these
programs and opportunities are those provisions dealing with the
employment and training of offenders.' 0
of respect for law by providing specific and general deterrence as well as correctional programs so
created as to produce the voluntary participation of offenders (§ 3-101).
This "just desserts" model of sentencing responds to many proposals arguing for such an approach
and rejecting indeterminant sentencing as inappropriate or ineffective or both. See, e.g., M. FRANKEL,
CRIMINAL SENTENCES (1973); D. LIPTON, B. MARTINSON & J. WILKs, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT (1975); N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976). The
present state legislative response, in-its movement away from indeterminant sentencing, also reflects
disenchantment with the present system. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170-1170.6 (West Supp.
1979); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-50-2-4 to 35-50-2-9 (Burns Supp. 1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A §§ 1253-1254 (Supp. 1979).
6. MSCA, supra note 1, Art. 4, Treatment of Convicted and Confined Persons. Article 4
delineates the protected interests and treatment of confined persons. It provides acode of treatment of
confined persons (pt. 1), provides methods of resolving internal correctional disputes by creating a
correctional mediator (pt. 2) and grievance procedures (pt, 3), adopts procedures for confined-person
assignment, classification, and transfer (pt. 4), prescribes a code of presumptive punishments for
disciplinary infractions (pt. 5), describes procedures for programs putting confined persons at risk (pt.
6), establishes a voucher program permitting confined persons to choose those rehabilitation programs
in which to participate (pt. 7), mandates provision of employment and training opportunities (pt. 8),
establishes a workers compensation program (pt. 9), and deals with the collateral consequences of
conviction and confinement (pt. 10).
7. The abandonment of coerced participation in rehabilitation programs reflects doubt as to
their effectiveness. See, e.g., D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J. WILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT (1975). It also relates to a policy choice embodied in the Act-to create a
correctional environment as near as possible to what life is like outside the prison. Expecting confined
persons to make, and accept responsibility for, their own decisions while incarcerated is, after all,
preparation for their release when "they will daily be required to make choices and exercise self-
restraint. If institutions of confinement do not replace self-restraint for compelled restraint, and
encourage choice rather than note obedience, released prisoners will continue to be unable to deal with
the 'real' world." COMMITTEE ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS 418-19 (tent. draft 1977), reprinted in 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 377 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as ABA JOINT COMM.].
8. See, e.g., MSCA, supra note 1, §§ 2-105 (programs and services); 3-507 (pre-release and post-
release programs); 4-11 l(b) (availability of community and institutional programs on an equal basis);
4-302 (grievance committees); 4-701 to -706 (voucher program).
9. MSCA, supra note 1, Prefatory Note, at 5.
10. Id., pt. 8, Employment and Training of Confined Persons. This part obligates the director to
upgrade and expand employment and vocational training opportunities (§ 4-801) and both to
administer prison industries and to encourage employment of confined persons by private enterprise
(§4-802); authorizes the establishment of programs that permit confined persons to work outside the
facility (§ 4-803) and permit private employers to establish enterprises on facility grounds (§ 4-804);
permits cost adjustments to be made to reimburse private employers on facilitygrounds foradditional
costs unavoidably incurred because of the nature of the confined-person work force (§ 4-805); clarifies
that a private employer hiring confined persons is not a state agency (§ 4-806); requires the adoption of
rules governing eligibility for employment and training assignments (§ 4-807); specifies that confined
persons may be required to perform general facility maintenance work and other essential services (§ 4-
808); requires improved management techniques for prison industries and permits the expending of
additional funds to support activities related to confined-person employment and training (§ 4-809);
permits handcrafts sales (§ 4-810); requires that, except where specified in the Act, free-world wages be
paid to employed confined persons (§ 4-811); assesses room and board and other costs against the
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The Special Committee to Draft the Model Sentencing and
Corrections Act" sought to create a correctional system in which
everything possible is done to encourage offender participation in
programs offering the potential of decreased recidivism among program
participants. Since the correlation between recidivism and the inability to
obtain and retain employment upon release is clear,12 a major priority of
the Model Act is to develop "adequate employment skills and habits for all
confined persons and [to assist] them [in finding] employment upon
release ... . Once fully implemented, the Model Act employment and
training provisions will provide, in contrast to the great majority of
presently operating correctional employment and training programs, 4 full
employment of confined persons at real world wages. 5 The employment
provisions include the familiar work-release program 6 as well as programs
permitting private employers to operate enterprises on the grounds of a
correctional facility.'
7
There are, then, in the Model Act and elsewhere,' 8 efforts being made
to provide realistic employment opportunities to confined persons. The
goal is that those released from facilities be persons with employable skills
who are ready, willing, and able to work.
wages of a confined person (§ 4-812); requires that department-held confined-person funds earn
interest payable to the confined person (§ 4-813); entitles a released confined person not placed in
comparable employment to a weekly wage for up to four weeks (§ 4-814); requires the adoption of rules
to prevent exploitation of confined-person labor (§ 4-815); and takes a first step towards avoiding the
interstate commerce restrictions on prison-made goods (§ 4-816). The Act also provides for workers"
compensation for work-related injuries to confined persons (§ 4-901 to 4-905).
11. This was the committee of Uniform Law Commissioners that had primary responsibility to
oversee the drafting of the Model Act.
12. E.g., D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE.SYSTEM 311-61 (1964); 6
ECON, INC., ANALYSIS OF PRISON INDUSTRIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, STUDY OF THE
ECONOMIC AND REHABILITATIVE ASPECTS OF PRISON INDUSTRY (Sept. 24, 1976); NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, CORRECTIONS, Standard 16.13, Commen-
tary, at 583-84 (1973) [hereinafter cited as NAC]; MSCA, supra note I, § 4-801, Comment, at 384. See
ABA JOINT COMM., supra note 7, Standard 4. 1, Commentary, at 460-65,7 LEAA NEWSLETTER No. 4,
at 4 (May 1978) (reporting institution of a new research project to study correlation between
employment and crime).
13. MCSA, supra note 1, § 4-801, Comment, at 384.
14. Prison industry systems are generally poorly managed and do not provide a realistic work
experience. See, e.g., 6 ECON, INC. ANALYSIS OF PRISON INDUSTRIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
CHANGE, STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC AND REHABILITATIVE ASPECTS OF PRISON INDUSTRY (Sept. 24,
1976); Jensen, Mazze, & Miller, Legal Reform of Prison Industries: New Opportunitiesfor Marketing
Managers, 12 AM. Bus. L.J. 173 (1974); PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON PRISONER REHABILITATION, THE
CRIMINAL OFFENDER-WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? 10 (1970). Further, the opportunities to work in a
prison industry or work release program are limited. G. LEVY, R. ABRAMS, & D. LADOw, FINAL
REPORT ON VOCATIONAL PREPARATION IN U.S. CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS TO THE U.S. DEPT. OF
LABOR iii-iv (1975) (of the total 1974 population in federal and state prisons, only 4% of prisoners were
qn work release and only 11% were employed in prison industries).
15. See, e.g., MSCA, supra note 1, §4-811. For information with respect to wages recently being
paid to employed confined persons, see HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON CRIME, REFORM OF OUR
CORRECTIONAL SYSTEMS, H.R. REP. No. 93-329, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1973).
16. E.g., MSCA, supra note 1, § 4-803.
17. Id. § 4-804.
18. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.88 (West Supp. 1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 354-2(1974).
See generally authorities cited in note 14 supra.
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III. AFTER RELEASE
A fully implemented and effective correctional employment and
training program that achieves the release of offenders sufficiently skilled
and motivated to succeed at paying jobs will have accomplished little if
these released offenders are unable to obtain jobs upon release. A
successful societal effort to decrease recidivism must couple correctional
programs that employ and train confined persons with a system that makes
available a wide variety of employment opportunities to ex-offenders upon
release.
To urge the availability of increased employment opportunities for
ex-offenders is not to suggest that they should be favored over
nonoffenders in competing for jobs or in any way be treated as a "suspect"
class for equal protection purposes.' 9 On the other hand, however
comforting it may be to some to discriminate against an ex-offender on
some theory of continued deserved punishment,20 an ex-offender should
not be disadvantaged merely because he has committed an offense in the
past.2t This view is, in part and perhaps most importantly, based on the
philosophical premise that the ex-offender has "paid his debt to society"
and, by so paying, justly deserves equal treatment by that society.
Moreover, this view is preeminently practical since to discriminate on the
basis of the offense committed decreases ex-offender employment
19. It is possible to describe ex-offenders as a class that received discriminatory treatment in the
past and thus requires affirmative action to right past wrongs. But affirmative action programs are
increasingly being challenged on legal and constitutional grounds. E.g., Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber,
99 S. Ct. 2710 (1979). And even if such programs are upheld for "suspect" classes, it is difficult to view
ex-offenders as a suspect class for constitutional purposes. See, e.g., Upshaw v. McNamara, 435 F.2d
1188, 1189 (1st Cir. 1970); Rubio v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 93,99,593 P.2d 595,600, 154 Cal. Rptr.
734,739 (1979). An ex-offender, even if compelled by economic necessity, committed a criminal offense,
and it was that affirmative, volitional act that brought him within the class receiving discriminatory
treatment. See Note, Employment of Former Criminals, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 306, 318 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Former Criminals].
Further, favored treatment in employment decisions would seem to exalt unduly the status of"ex-
offender" in situations such as neighbor-on-neighbor or intra-family crime where the ex-offender and
victim frequently share similar socio-economic backgrounds and problems. See MSCA, supra note 1,
at 430. Favored treatment would seem particularly unfair in these instances since it would permit the
commission of an offense, in and of itself, to set the ex-offender apart from his "peers" and give him the
employment edge.
Even if philosophically sound, a "favored treatment" approach is not only unlikely to win political
support for attempts to expand ex-offender employment opportunities but may lead to increased union
opposition to the confined-person employment provisions of the Model Act on the theory that if
satisfactory work skills and habits are not instilled in confined persons while imprisoned then ex-
offenders will not pass the test of competence required of applicants before any favored treatment
approach is used. It follows that if ex-offenders do not pass this test of competence, even favored
treatment will not lead to offender displacement of non-offender job applicants. But cf. J. WEST &J.
STRATTON, THE ROLE OF CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIEs 63 (1971) (indicating union opposition to
confined-person employment competition may be on the decline) and discussion in note 80 infra.
20. This was, in part, the rationale in earlier times for mutilations and brandings. See The
Collateral Consequences of A Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929,944-45 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Vanderbilt Special Project]. A good example of this approach can be seen in N. HAWTHORNE,
THE SCARLET LETrER (Ticknor, Reed & Fields ed. 1850).
21. This is not to say, however, that a criminal record ought never be considered by potential
employers. See text accompanying notes 157-59 infra.
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opportunities and, in turn, this lack of employment increases the chances
that the ex-offender will recidivate.2a It need hardly be said that the best
interests of society are ill-served by a treatment of ex-offenders that makes
their recidivism more likely.
Historically, societal treatment of ex-offenders went well beyond
employment discrimination;23 upon commission of a crime a person
suffered corruption of blood and forfeiture of estate.24 Today we have
eliminated these penalties and are well on the way to elimination of all
vestiges25 of the concept of civil death26 of offenders. In the Model
Sentencing and Corrections Act, for example, the Special Committee
chose to include a provision that expressly retains for an offender "all
rights political, personal, civil, and otherwise '27 unless specifically
22. See cases and authorities cited in note 12 supra.
23. Vanderbilt Special Project, supra note 20, at 944. See also cases and authorities cited in note
34 infra.
24. Forfeiture of estate meant that the convicted person lost all real and personal property
owned by him. Comment, Arizona's Living Dead: Civil Death and Disabilities in Arizona, 1975 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 137, 144 [hereinafter cited as Arizona Living Dead]. In England, however, such property
escheated to the King only upon the King's application for it. Vanderbilt Special Project, supra note20,
at 943. Until that time the offender could exercise ownership rights over the property. Id. In the United
States forfeiture was an automatic consequence of conviction. S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL
CORRE TION 24 (1963). Corruption of blood meant, generally, that upon commission of a criminal
offense a person could neither devise nor inherit property. Comment, Civil Death in California: A
Concept Overdue for its Grave, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 427,429 (1975). See, e.g., Avery v. Everett,
110 N.Y. 317, 324, 18 N.E. 148, 150 (1888). See generally Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of
Conviction and Removal: A Comparative Study, 59 J. CRIm. L.C. & P.S. 347, 350-51 (1968); 4
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 373-82. In the United States, forfeiture and corruption of blood are
prohibited punishments except during the life of an offender who committed treason. U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 3.
25. Some vestiges of civil death remain. Eg., ALASKA STAT. § 11.05.080 (Supp. 1970); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 353-38 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 18-311 (1979); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79(a)(1)(McKinney
1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13-6-1 (1969).
26. Civil death meant just that. Upon commission of a crime and until release the offender was
declared legally dead. Arizona Living Dead, supra note 24, at 138 n.3. See In re Estate of Donnelly, 125
Cal. 417,419, 58 P. 61 (1899); Byers v. Sun Savings Bank, 41 Okla. 728, 731, 139 P. 948,949 (1914).
Civil or legal death, however, did not mean the extinguishment of all rights there is disagreement
among courts as to which rights a prisoner loses when civilly dead. Vanderbilt Special Project, supra
note 20, at 951.
27. MSCA, supra note 1, § 4-1001 (Rights Retained):
(a) A person convicted of an offense does not suffer civil death orcorruption of blood.
(b) Except as provided by [the Constitution of this State or] this Act, a person
convicted of an offense does not sustain loss of civil rights or forfeiture of estate or property
by reason of a conviction or confinement; he retains all rights, political, personal, civil, and
otherwise, including the right to:
(1) be a candidate for, be elected or appointed to, or hold public office or
employment:
(2) vote in elections;
(3) hold, receive, and transfer property;
(4) enter into contracts;
(5) sue and be sued;
(6) hold offices of private trust in accordance with law;
(7) execute affidavits and other judicial documents;
(8) marry, separate, obtain a dissolution or annulment of marriage, adopt
children, or withhold consent to the adoption of children; and
(9) testify in legal proceedings.
(c) This section does not affect laws governing the right of a person to benefit from
the death of his victim.
For a general treatment of each of the aspects of § 4-1001, see Vanderbilt Special Project, supra
note 20.
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excluded by state constitution or other provisions of the Model Act
28
Some jurisdictions, although providing no such automatic retention of
rights, permit the restoration of rights by statute,29 or by legislative or
executive pardon. 30 However achieved, the fact that offenders and ex-
offenders are declared able, among other things, to inherit, marry,
contract, sue, and be sued is hardly sufficient. In many jurisdictions certain
civil disabilities are specifically retained.3 Even today, for example, a
confined offender may not be able to vote12 and even after release may be
prohibited from holding public office33 or serving as a juror.34
In the absence in ajurisdiction of an express civil death statute, a statutory retention of rights may
well be redundant. See, e.g., Owens v. Owens, 100 N.C. 240,6 S.E. 794(1888). The Model Act included
the provision rather than a mere repealer of all contrary legislation (cf. MSCA, supra note 1, § 6-203),
at least in part on the theory that it is better to say something twice than risk a court deciding it was
never said at all.
Section 4-1001 of the Model Act was patterned after, and supersedes, the Uniform Act on the
Status of Convicted Persons adopted by the National Conference in 1964. In most respects the
provisions in the two statutes are alike. The Uniform Act on the Status of Convicted Persons has been
adopted in New Hampshire and Hawaii. See NCCUSL, REFERENCE BOOK at Table 1 (1978).
28. There are very few exclusions from the operation of this section in the Model Act. They are
(I) inheritance rights in cases in which the victim's death is caused by-and benefits-the offender or
ex-offender(§4-1001(c) ); (2) forfeiture of public office under the conditions prescribed in § 4-1004; and
(3) juror eligibility of offenders while incarcerated and of persons convicted of felonies while serving
their sentences and until sentence discharge (§ 4-1002). The scope and thrust of the exclusions received
serious consideration by the Special Committee. The reason for the exclusion of inheritance rights is
obvious. The provision dealing with forfeiture of public office is explained in note 61 infra. The
ineligibility for jury duty of confined offenders is, in part, a recognition of the practical difficulties
attendant on jury service by someone confined. It also reflects, as does the disqualification offelons, the
Special Committee's sense of the impropriety of a person sitting as a juror while himself serving a
sentence and, more importantly, of committee fear of the potential either of a bias against the system by
the offender juror or of undue pressure brought to bear upon the offender juror by representatives of
the system. Once the sentence is discharged juror eligibility automatically is restored. In many states
this is not the ease. See authorities cited in note 34 infra.
29. In some states restoration occurs automatically, either upon satisfactory completion of the
sentence, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 57.078 (Supp. 1979-80), and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27-35
(1979), or after the passage of a specified amount of time after release, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE.
ANN. § 9.96.050 (1977). Other states permit the restoration of rights upon ex-offender application, e.g.,
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-906 to 13-908 (1978). In still other states restoration of rights is
accomplished after ex-offender application by the issuance by a board of a certificate of rehabilitation
or as an incident to the parole decision, e.g., N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 703 (McKinney Supp. 1979-80)
(certificate of relief from disabilities). Any approach requiring ex-offender initiative is, however, of
limited use since so few ex-offenders will ever apply. See Former Criminals, supra note 19, at 313; Note,
Reducing Civil Disabilities for Convicted Felons in North Dakota: A Step in the Right Direction,.50
N.D.L. REV. 61, 61 (1973).
30. Arizona Living Dead, supra note 24, at 151. See S. RUEIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL
CORRECTIONS 577-78 (1963).
31. In addition to civil death statutes, states have a myriad ofstatutes disabling an offender or ex-
offender from pursuing specific activities such as voting (see statutes cited in note 32 infra), holding
public office (see statutes cited note 33 infra), and obtaining licenses (see note 36 infra).
32. See, e.g., ALA. CONsr. art. VIII § 182; ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 15 (1958); ALASKA STAT.
§ 15.05.030 (1976). ARIZ. CONSr. art. VII, § 2; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-101 (West Supp. 1979);
ARK. CONST. amend. 8, § 1; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-46 (West Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1701 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.041 (3)(b) (West Supp. 1978) (unless rights restored); IDAHO
CONsT. arts. 6 & 3; Miss. CONST. art. XII, § 241; Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-35 (1972); N.D. CONST. art.
V, §§ 122, 127; WYOMING CONST. art. 6, § 6; WYOMING STAT. § 6-4 (1977).
Confined persons are specifically afforded the right to vote under the Model Act. MSCA, supra
note I, § 4-1003. The Model Act describes domicile for voting purposes as "the last legal residence
before confinement." Id. This was done to avoid the undue impact on local elections that could possibly
result if confined persons in areas with small populations vote as a bloc. The Model Act also grants a
confined person the right to vote by absentee ballot. Id. § 4-112.
33. Eg., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 1021 (West Supp. 1966); CoLo. CONST. art XII, § 4; NEV. REV. STAT.
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These disabilities affect the ex-offender's status as a citizen and his
ability to function completely as a reintegrated member of the free
community. There is hope that these disabilities, too, will slowly be
eliminated.35 But the most serious disabilities affecting recidivism-
employment discrimination and licensing restrictions-still remain.
And so today a governmental agency may choose to refuse-or,
indeed, be forced by statute to refuse-to license even a pardoned ex-
offender36 for an occupation or profession," and an employer may refuse
to hire him solely because he once committed a crime.38
The present system of prohibitions against licensing of ex-offenders
contains a myriad of restrictions, worded generally or specifically, that
operate to preclude ex-offenders from employment without supportable
reasons. As the President's Task Force described it:
[I]t seems appropriate to suspend or revoke licenses for offenses involving
dangerous driving, both to remove the unfit driver from the road and to deter
such behavior. But to ban convicted persons from numerous activities
without regard to the particular conviction's relevance to the particular
activity can be expected seriously to impede efforts to rehabilitate offenders
by encouraging their participation in society, without any compensating
benefit to society.
Most of the law in this area is overly broad. Thus, good character is often
made a prerequisite for activities where it is of no particular relevance. It is,
§ 197.230 (1973); PA. CONST. art. II, § 7.
34. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.20.020 (1973) (until rights restored); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 199
(West. Supp. 1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-71-109(2) (d) (1973); LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art401(5)
(West 1967) (unless pardoned); N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 509(a), 510(4) (McKinney Supp. 1979-80);TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2133(5), (6) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79). See Rubio v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 93,
154 Cal. Rptr. 734, 593 P.2d 595 (1979).
35. Compare, e.g., NCCUSL, UNIFORM ACT ON THE STATUS OF CONVICTED PERSONS(1964), with
MSCA, supra note 1, §§ 4-1001 to 4-1005. Another example of this trend can be found in FED. R. EVID.
609(c) (prohibiting impeachment of credibility based on a pardon, annulment, or other procedure
based on a finding of rehabilitation). See United States v. Thorne, 547 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1976).
36. This is true for licenses that may be issued only to applicants having no criminal record as
well as for licenses that may be issued only to those of good moral character. S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 608 (1963). Courts are generally agreed that a pardon does not mean that an
ex-offender is of good moral character. Vanderbilt Special Project, supra note 20, at 1145. Ex-
offenders' restored rights through statute are treated similarly and, thus, are also not restored to license
eligibility. Id. at 1148. See generally Comment, Criminal Records of Arrest and Conviction:
Expungementfrom the General Public Access, 3 CAL. W.L. REV. 121 (1967). A distinction in treatment
based on whether the person had been issued the license before the commission of the offense was
recently rejected as a violation of equal protection. Millerv. Carter, 547 F.2d 1314(7th Cir. 1977), aff'd,
434 U.S. 356 (1978).
37. E.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT& ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE ON CORRECTIONS 90-91 (1967) (hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CORRECTIONS];
ABA JOINT COMM., supra note 7, at 614-16; MSCA, supra note I, at 424-26. For a comprehensive
study of ex-offender licensing restrictions and prohibitions, see ABA CLEARINGHOUSE ON OFFENDER
EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS, REMOVING OFFENDER EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS (March 1976). See
also Vanderbilt Special Project, supra note 20, at 1162; Note, The Revolving Door: The Effect of
Employment Discrimination Against Ex-Prisoners, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1403 (1975).
38. See, e.g., ABA JOINT COMM., supra note 7, at 615-16; MSCA, supra note I, at 425; Former
Criminals, supra note 19, at 313; PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CORRECTIONS, supra note 37, at 31-33;
Vanderbilt Special Project, supra note 20, at 1001; S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 639
(1963).
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for example, a common requirement for obtaining a barber's license. Yet it is
doubtful whether good character is of any more importance to exercise of
one's duties as a barber than to most other occupations. And regulatory
legislation generally makes no effort to define the kind of character, and thus
the kind of convictions, relevant to fitness. . . In the area of individual
licenses, professional and occupational groups are often given the power to
determine who is initially qualified to receive a license, and to regulate the
standards of those licensed by defining rules of conduct and revoking or
suspending licenses for breach of those rules. Such groups tend to be
primarily concerned with the interests of their own members. Thus, when
faced with the problem of whether to license persons with criminal records,
they may be unduly concerned with the effect on the status of their
professions. Further, to the extent they try to consider the public interest,
they are likely to have an unrealistic view of the importance of their own
profession or occupation. .. 29
The statutes precluding license eligibility are stated in terms of a
prohibition of license issuance to offenders who committed infamous
crimes. The application of such provisions is broader than one might have
guessed: all felonies are infamous for civil disability purposes.40 Other
statutes require a disqualification of applicants demonstrating moral
turpitude. This generally means an offender may not obtain a license if the
offense committed, whether felony or misdemeanor, is contrary to justice
or good morals. 41 Furthermore, absent a statute prohibiting it, a private
employer can refuse to hire an ex-offender solely because he was once
convicted of a crime.
We are left, then, with an ex-offender whose rights may be restored or,
as in the Model Act, were retained while imprisoned, but who is
nevertheless unable to pursue fully employment opportunities for which he
is qualified and that are available generally in the free community. What
more, if anything, can and should be done?
A. Record Expungement and Sealing
There are several approaches that attempt to decrease or eliminate
these and other collateral consequences of conviction and confinement,42
and the most efficient system may well require a combination of
approaches.43 The retention or restoration of rights described above is a
39. PRESIDENT'S COM f' ON CORRECTIONS, supra note 37, at 91. See also Bromberger,
Rehabilitation and Occupational Licensing: A Conflict of Interests, 13 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 794
(1972); Stacy, Limitations on Denying Licensure to Ex-Offenders, 2 CAP. U.L. REV. 1 (1973); NAC,
supra note 12, Standard 2.10 and Commentary.
40. Vanderbilt Special Project, supra note 20, at 958-59.
41. Id. at 960.
42. As used throughout this article, the "collateral consequences of conviction and confinement"
are the civil consequences of a criminal conviction that result through adherence to statute, caselaw, or
practice. See generally Vanderbilt Special Project, supra note 20. Since statutory civil disabilities
attach only upon conviction, courts have faced definitional problems with respect to when that occurs.
Id. at 953-55.
43. See ABA JOINT CoNi., supra note 7, at 610; NAC, supra note 12, at 47.
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necessary beginning. Expungement 4 and the sealing of records45 together
represent another approach. This approach attempts to eliminate
collateral consequences basically by acting as if the ex-offender's criminal
record never existed.46 Expungement and sealing are predicated on the
undeniable truth that a criminal record can produce no adverse effect if its
existence is unknown and undiscoverable.
One problem with this approach, however, is doubt whether
expungement or sealing can, in fact, accomplish this result. It is unclear
whether an ex-offender whose record is expunged, or even merely sealed,
may respond "no" to a question on an employment questionnaire that asks
the applicant if he has ever been convicted of a crime.47 Specific authority
for this may be necessary and several states have given it through a
statutory provision that "no" is an appropriate response.48 Another
difficulty is whether, with today's computer technology, a record can ever
successfully be expunged.49 Moreover, the keeping of duplicate records by
state and federal law enforcement agencies makes it difficult to reach even
all relevant records kept by those bodies.50
Perhaps a more basic problem with an approach that seeks to
44. E.g., N.J. REv. STAT. § 2C:51-4 (1979). Expungement generally means that the affected
records, including fingerprints, photographs, and court files, are destroyed. Note, The Rights of the
Innocent Arrestee: Sealing of Records under California Penal Code Section 851.8,28 HASTINGS L.J.
1463, 1469 (1977). Expungement statutes generally require that the ex-offender spend a period of
"clean time" after release before eligibility for expungement. See Former Criminals, supra note 19, at
314; ABA JOINT COMM., supra note 7, at 624-25.
45. Sealing records preserves the records themselves but eliminates, or limits to specified
agencies, access to those records. Former Criminals, supra note 19, at314. Employers havebeenableto
avoid this limitation, however, by requiring applicants to sign waivers permitting employers to review
otherwise confidential information. Id. at 316.
46. Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A
Problem ofStatus, 1966 WAsH. L. Q. 147, 151.
47. See, e.g., Schaefer, The Federal Youth Corrections Act: The Purposes and Uses ofVacating
the Conviction, 39 FED. PROB. 31 (September 1975). It might be possible for a state to restrict
employers to questions relating only to unexpunged or unsealed arrests and convictions. E.g., COLO.
REV. STAT., § 24-72-308(6) (Supp. 1978).
48. Eg., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203.4-.4a, 1203.45 (West Supp. 1979); COLO. REv. STAT., § 24-72-
308(6) (Supp. 1978).
49. See Former Criminals, supra note 19, at 316. The Federal Youth Corrections Act, for
example, was intended to provide for expungement of youth records. See, e.g., Harnsberger, Does the
Federal Youth Corrections Act Remove the "Leper's Bell"from Rehabilitated Offenders?, 7 FLA. ST.
L. REV. 395 (1979). Nonetheless, expunged juvenile records have been used routinely by the United
States Parole Commission in making parole decisions. Coffee, Repressed Issues of Sentencing.
Accountability, Predictability, and Equality in the Era ofthe Sentencing Commission, 66 GEo. L.J.
975, 1018 n. 124(1978). See Fitev. Retail Credit Co., 386 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Mont. 1975), aff'd, 537 F.2d
384 (9th Cir. 1976); Note, The Rights ofthe Innocent Arrestee: Sealing of Records under California
Penal Code Section 851.8, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1463, 1464 (1977).
50. A state order to seal or expunge does not reach duplicate copies in federal files. Note, The
Rights ofthe Innocent Arrestee: Sealing ofRecords under California Penal Code Section 851.8,28
HASTINGS L.J. 1463, 1468 n.28 (1977). See generally Former Criminals, supra note 19, at 316; Note,
Criminal Law-F.B.I. Retention of Criminal Identification Records- Tarlton v. Saxbe, 29 RtrrGEas
L. REV. 151 (1975). The FBI has now developed procedures to expunge nonfederal arrest records in its
files (as well as to notify all agencies to which the FBI supplied the information). These procedures
require that expungement orders be processed through the local arresting agency before transmittal to
the F.B.I. 6 CRIM. JUSTICE (No. 4, Winter 1979). Unfortunately, these procedures are frequently not
followed; this results in confusion and difficulty in achieving complete expungement since the court
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eliminate the record itself is that we nowhere put it fully into practice.
Legislatures are understandably reluctant to destroy all traces of the
criminal record of a person without the impossible guarantee that he will
not recidivate. This reluctance translates into expungement statutes that
generally relate either to minor crimes or to those crimes for which the
offender was sentenced to probation;51 it translates into sealing statutes
that permit various specified agencies access to the sealed records.5 If these
statutes were drafted more broadly, however, their potential reach could
also create problems since a criminal record may well be relevant to an
employment decision. Surely a bank, for example, should have access to
information that a prospective employee is a convicted embezzler. And
surely that bank should be able to refuse to hire him even in a system
seeking to protect and expand ex-offender employment opportunities.
3
A final problem with an expungement approach relates to its
appropriateness. Even if practical and successful, expungement and
sealing raise a basic policy question since
[t]hey deprive employers and others of the right to know the truth about the
man with whom they are dealing. At the same time, concealment puts the
former offender in the position of being discreditable, a position hardly more
enviable than being discredited. In short, the laws attempt to build on a lie
personal relationships that can only develop through mutual trust and
respect.
5 4
Expungement and sealing, after all, run counter to modern public
sentiment that government and its records should be open and accessible. 5
orders generally lack sufficient identifying information to permit the F.B.I. to comply with the request.
Id.
Some states also make an attempt to reach duplicate copies by routinely notifying of record
erasure all agencies that received a copy of the record now erased. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-
142a(e) (Supp. 1978).
Conflicting federal and state policies, moreover, may also cause difficulties. For example, it is a
federal offense for an ex-offender, convicted in either a state or federal court of a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, to be in possession of a firearm or ammunition that has
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (1976). It has been
held that an offender whose state offense subjects him to the federal statute will commit a federal
offense by carrying a gun even if his state conviction was expunged by a state court order. United States
v. Herrell, 588 F.2d 711 (1978); United States v. Potts, 528 F.2d 883 (1975).
51. See Former Criminals, supra note 19, at 314; ABA JOINT COMM., supra note 7, at 624-25.
52. See authority cited in note 45 supra.
53. See text accompanying notes 150-58 infra, discussing a direct relationship standard for
permissible ex-offender employment discrimination.
54. Former Criminals, supra note 19, at 316-17.
55. Eg., MD. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§29-1 to29-11 (1976);NEB. REV. STAT. §§49-1401 to49-14,138
(1978); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 244.010 to 244.390 (1977). Moreover, at least in theory, expungement and
sealing of records are inconsistent with sentencing schemes that impose greater punishment on the
repeat or persistent offender. Eg., MSCA, supra note 1, § 3-104. In practice, however, expungement
and sealing statutes provide some mechanism for use of priorrecords by law enforcement agencies and
courts when the ex-offender commits a latercrime. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2264 (1975); Former
Criminals, supra note 19, at 315.
It should be noted here that the societal interest in open and public records is matched by a societal
interest in individual privacy. See, e.g., the Privacy Act of 1974,5 U.S.C. § 522a (1976). See generally
STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
FEDERAL DATA BANKS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: A STUDY OF DATA SYSTEMS ON INDIVIDUALS
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For these reasons, and after much debate, the Special Committee to
Draft the Model Sentencing and Corrections Act omitted provisions for
expungement or sealing of records. It seems reasonably clear that any
jurisdiction including this option will neither cover all offenders and all
crimes nor will the operation of the statutes be uniformly successful. We
are left, then, with an ex-offender who may not always-or even almost
always-be able to hide his status from prospective employers and who is
protected from licensing disabilities and employment discrimination by
neither pardon nor retention or restoration of rights.
B. Prohibiting Employment Discrimination
The approach that provides the most hope for success in achieving ex-
offender employment 6 is that on which the Special Committee to Draft
the Model Sentencing and Corrections Act placed greatest reliance:57 a
statute requiring a determination that there exists a direct relationship
between the employment activity in which the ex-offender seeks to engage
and the offense that he committed. In the absence of such a relationship the
Model Act prohibits both licensing restrictions" and discrimination
against ex-offenders, whether by employers in employment decisions, 59 by
trade or professional schools in admission decisions,60 or by unions or
professional organizations in which membership is a condition of
61
employment.
Courts without such legislative guidance have generally been very
MAINTAINED BY AGENCIES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENi, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). Striking an
appropriate balance between these two interests-or even agreeing on what that appropriate balance
should be-is not easy. Cf. Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis.2d 417, 279 N.W.2d 179 (1979).
56. Former Criminals, supra note 19, at 317-20. See, e.g., Vanderbilt Special Project, supra note
20, at 1160-61; ABA JOINT COMM., upra note 7, Standard 10.4 and Commentary, at 614-16.
57. MCSA, supra note 1, § 4-1005 and Comment. This approach may be particularly useful
when coupled with a new federal program permitting private employers a tax write-offof up to S4500
for employment of, among others, economically disadvantaged ex-offenders less than five years from
conviction or release date. For a brief description of this Targeted Jobs Tax Credit Program, see 8
LEAA NEWSLETTER 3 (May 1979).
58. MSCA, supra note 1, § 4-005(b)(4). This section includes the practice of law within its
mandate. For a discussion of the particular difficulties raised by inclusion of licensing lawyers, see notes
116-21 and accompanying text infra. The American Bar Association has also taken a position opposed
to licensing restrictions of ex-offenders based solely on the fact of the commission of the prior offense.
61 A.B.A.J. 1088 (1975).
59. Employment decisions include hiring and firing as well as decisions governing wages or the
terms and conditions of employment. Id. § 4-1005(b)(1).
60. Id. § 4-1005(b)(2).
61. Id. § 4-1005(b)(3). The Model Act, in addition to its requirement of a direct relationship in
ex-offender employment discrimination, provides a specific section governing public office. MSCA,
supra note 1, § 4-1004. The section requires a state legislature to specify particularly those offenses
requiring the forfeiture of public office. Some aspects of forfeiture are controlled by constitutional
provisions. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 4. These will exist regardless of legislative statement.
It is hoped that under § 4-1004 the offenses specified by the legislature will be those offenses
directly relating to the office-holder's ability to perform fairly the responsibilities of the office. MSCA,
supra note 1, § 4-1004 and Comment. The offenses that are seemingly most relevant here would be
those, such as bribery or felonious theft, relating to the honesty of the individual. For an example of a
specification of offenses requiring forfeiture, see NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAWS PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 3501(a), (b) (1971). By contrast, the
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reluctant to overturn license denials based on an applicant's past criminal
record.62 Their decisions have, for example, upheld denials of a license to
practice medicine because of a conviction for refusing to cooperate with
the House Un-American Activities Committee,63 of a license to drive a
taxicab because of a conviction for distributing socialist literature,64 of a
license to practice law because of a selective service violation,65 and of a
66license to sell beer because of a bad check conviction. 6 In the past few
years, judicial concern has been spurred, at least in part, by several United
States Supreme Court cases in which the opportunity to pursue a
particular occupation or profession was described as a significant interest
67
that carries with it due process protection.68 Although none of these
Supreme Court cases dealt with exclusions based on status as an ex-
offender, the standard described therein, a rational connection between the
employment sought and the reasons underlying the decision to disqualify
from employment, 69 nonetheless appears to be applicable to ex-
offenders.70 Even De Veau v. Braisted,7' in which the Supreme Court
upheld a blanket statutory exclusion of convicted felons from jobs as
officers or agents of unions representing workers on the New York
Waterfront, made it clear that the exclusion was permissible because it was
designed to correct "a notoriously serious situation [needing] drastic
Model Penal Code requires forfeiture of office upon the commission of any felony as well as any offense
involving malfeasance in office or dishonesty. MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.2 (1973). Other authorities
would predicate forfeiture upon imprisonment. E.g., NAC, supra note 12, Standard 16.17. This
provision presumably relates, at least in part, to a determination that an imprisoned official cannot
adequately fulfill the requirements of his office.
62. See, e.g., Barskyv. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954); Hawker v. United States, 170 U.S.
189 (1898); and cases and authorities cited in notes 63-66 infra. Seegenerally ABA JOINT Comm., supra
note 7, at 614.
63. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954). See Page v. Watson, 140 Fla. 536, 192 So.
205 (1939) (revocation of medical license because of conviction for perjury).
64. Kaufman v. Taxicab Bureau, 236 Md. 476, 204 A.2d 521 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 849
(1965). This decision was also based on Kaufman's lack of cooperation with the police to abate the
disorders it was felt he helped create.
65. Application of Brooks, 57 Wash.2d 66, 355 P.2d 840 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 813
(1961).
66. Copeland v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 241 Cal. App. 2d 186,50 Cal. Rptr.
452 (1966).
67. The characterization question regarding whether something is a "right" is less important
than the determination of the due process requirements that attach before its deprivation. See, e.g.,
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971).
68. See, e.g., Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (person denied license to
practice law must be given opportunity to confront adverse witnesses); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S.
474,500(1959) (government employee denied security clearance must be given opportunity to confront
adverse witnesses); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (overturning denial of
license to practice law on the basis of prior arrest and membership in Communist Party).
69. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). The cases also require notice and
an opportunity both to be heard and to confront the evidence presented. Willner v. Committee on
Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
70. See Smith v. Fussenich, 440 F. Supp. 1077, 1081 (D. Conn. 1977); ABA JOINT COMM.,supra
note 7, at 614.
71. 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
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reform. 72 In recent cases requiring a rational connection, courts have
required reinstatement of a federal civil service employee convicted of
possession of a controlled substance," invalidated a statute that barred all
felony offenders from civil service employment, 74 and found an equal
protection violation through overbreadth in a statute that barred all felony
offenders from employment as licensed private detectives and security
guards .75
Notwithstanding the foregoing account, help from the courts, even if
the case law is progressing in the right direction, is both slow and too
limited. This is a difficulty endemic to a court-fashioned solution. A court,
acting on a case-by-case basis, is naturally hesitant to set broad policy for
fear of not seeing, or not completely understanding the ramifications of,
the big picture. Further, and perhaps more explanatory of the reason for
slow progress here, a court challenged to act on a violation of a
constitutional right will establish a minimum standard below which no
decisionmaker may go without violating the right; in so acting the court
makes no claim that it is setting the best and wisest policy.76 It is also true
that great deference is paid to the expertise reflected in the agency
determination, because, under the rational relationship standard applied
in these cases, a small quantity of evidence is sufficient to uphold an agency
determination.77 Finally, a court decision may not always provide as clear
a basis for appellate review of agency action as would a specific statutory
standard.
The role of the legislature, on the other hand, is to provide wise policy
choices in enacted legislation. Properly drafted legislation can provide a
clear and specific standard both for implementation of the statutory
mandate and for appellate review of the action undertaken in light of the
statute. Such legislative leadership can prod reluctant agencies and
employers into providing employment opportunities to ex-offenders. It
was with this goal in mind that the Special Committee to Draft the Model
Sentencing and Corrections Act included a statutory direct relationship
test for ex-offender licensing and employment.
This determination to provide a legislative solution is one that is
shared by several jurisdictions that have enacted legislation similar to the
Model Sentencing and Corrections Act, legislation requiring a direct
72. Id. at 147. The Court cited evidence produced at trial that the employment of ex-offenders
greatly contributed to the unacceptable level of crime and violence on the waterfront.
73. Young v. Hampton, 568 F.2d 1253, 1258 (7th Cir. 1977) (based on statutory standard
permitting disciplinary action when necessary to "promote the efficiency of the service").
74. Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573 (D. Iowa 1974).
75. Smith v. Fussenich, 440 F. Supp. 1077 (D. Conn. 1977). But see Hetherington v. California
State Personnel Board, 82 Cal. App. 3d 58, 147 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1978), and text accompanying notes
113, 114 infra.
76. On the difference between constitutional minima and wise policy, see Jones v. North
Carolina Prisoner's Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 136 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring); and
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1963).
77. See, e.g., Young v. Hampton, 568 F.2d 1253, 1258-59 (7th Cir. 1977).
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relationship between the employment sought and the offense committed.78
Minnesota,79 for example, a state in the forefront of state correctional
reform (particularly in the area of prisoner employment), 80 has probably
the most comprehensive and detailed of any of the state statutes governing
the subject of ex-offender employment discrimination. The Minnesota
statute sets forth at the outset the rationale for enacting the legislation and
indicates that the statute should be expansively interpreted in making and
evaluating ex-offender employment and licensing decisions.81 As described
in the Minnesota legislation, the state's policy is "to encourage and
contribute to the rehabilitation of criminal offenders and to assist them in
the resumption of the responsibilities of citizenship. 82 Meaningful
employment opportunities are described as "essential ' 83 to the achieve-
ment of those goals. Thus the legislative tone is set.
C. Public Employment and Licensing
1. Administrative Process to Handle
Employment Discrimination Grievances
Ex-offender claims of employment discrimination in the denial of
public employment or a license are handled in Minnesota, and in all other
78. E.g. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-61q (West Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.011 (Supp.
1974-78); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 364.01 -. 10 (West Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-2-1 to -2-6
(1978); N.Y. CIVIL PRAC. LAW § 7803 (McKinney Supp. 1979-80); N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 755
(McKinneySupp. 1979-80); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.96A.010-.050 (Supp. 1976). See also HAWAII REV.
STAT. ch. 378 (1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 11:10-6.1 (West 1976) (civil service employment).
79. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 364.01 -.10 (West Supp. 1979).
80. The strong Minnesota support for the upgrading and expansion of prisoner employment
opportunities is due, at least in part, to active interest and encouragement by the Minnesota
Department of Corrections and its commissioner, Kenneth Schoen. For a demonstration of that
interest, see Letter from Kenneth Schoen to J.R. Potuto (Dec. 15, 1976) (on file in Model Sentencing
and Corrections Act Project Office, University of Nebraska Law College, Lincoln, Neb.). The
Department even has a Director of Private Industry. See Letter from Howard G. Fortier, Secretary-
Treasurer, Minnesota Teamsters Joint Council No. 32, to S. Wood (April 21, 1976) (copy on file in
Model Sentencing and Corrections Act Project Office, University of Nebraska Law College, Lincoln,
Neb.). In consequence, (1) formal union cooperation with the Minnesota private industries program
has been obtained, see id.; (2) progressive legislation has been enacted, see, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §
243.88 (West Supp. 1979); and there has been movement to eliminate federal legislation that impedes
prisoner employment programs such as that of Minnesota. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 4871, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1976) (sponsored by among others, Rep. Al Quie, R-Minn.). On June 9, 1976, Mr. Schoen
testified in support of the bill before the House sub-committee on labor standards.
81. Other states have enacted similar policy provisions. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-61n
(West Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §28-2-2 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.96A.010 (Supp. 1976). The
Model Sentencing and Corrections Act contains no such policy statement introductory to its
provisions on ex-offender employment discrimination. The comments to these provisions, however, do
reflect that an expansive interpretation is anticipated. MSCA, supra note 1, §§ 4-1001 to 4-1005 and
Comments. The comments to the Model Act, however, as with any other model or uniform act, are not
enacted by a state that enacts the statutory provisions. In addition, although the Special Committee
had the opportunity to review the comments, which the author believes are consistent with the intent of
the Special Committee, the comments are the work of the reporters, essentially unedited by the Special
Committee. Being comments, they were not formally approved by either the Special Committee or the
conference as a whole.
82. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.01 (West Supp. 1979).
83. Id. In addition to policy statements in statutes specifically dealing with ex-offender
employment discrimination, at least one state includes ex-offenders in its general fair employment
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states with ex-offender employment discrimination legislation, through
resort by the grievant to the procedures of a state administrative procedure
act or its equivalent.8 4 Use of the administrative process permits employer
decisions to be reviewed and, when found erroneous, corrected internally.
The administrative process thereby leaves review in the first instance with
the expertise and professional judgment of the employer or licensing
agency. This affords great weight to agency judgments85 while relieving the
court process from hearing those cases in which the ultimate agency
determination proves satisfactory to the grievant. Judicial control of
agency excesses is preserved by court review of those cases not resolved
internally. The standard of review is that standard generally applied to
appeals from agency decisions.86
The Minnesota legislation also includes detailed procedures gover-
ning notice to the ex-offender applicant denied employment or a license.
8 7
This is probably done routinely by public employers and licensing agencies
and, in any case, may well reflect a concern for the grievant's due process
interest.88 Even if a denial of a license or public employment based on ex-
offender status gives rise to neither substantive nor procedural due process
claims this situation certainly changes once a statute exists creating a right
of nondiscrimination; presumably, then, an adverse determination triggers
a right to notice and a hearing. 89 Further, the very requirement of
articulation of the reason for an adverse decision may help assure that the
statutory test is followed by decisionmakers.
policy statements. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.31 (West 1974 and Supp. 1979-80). In yet anotherstate, there
is a general policy of ex-offender employment, although the statute does not include provisions
prohibiting ex-offender employment discrimination. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §41-1955(1974). See also
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23, 12-55-24 (1957).
84. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.06 (West Supp. 1979).
85. See text accompanying notes 161-63 infra. See generally K. DAVIs, DISCRETIONARY JUsTICE
(1969).
86. E.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976); MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT § 15(g) (rev. 1961).
87. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.05 (West Supp. 1979). Connecticut has a similar provision. CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-61o(b) (West Supp. 1979). New Mexico also requires a written statement. N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 28-2-4 (1978). New York requires a written statement of reasons when requested by the
ex-offender. N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 754 (McKinney Supp. 1979-80).
88. E.g., Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S.
474,500 (1959); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d
605 (5th Cir. 1964); Fascination v. Hoover, 39 Cal.2d 260, 246 P.2d 656 (1952); Milligan v. Board of
Registration, 348 Mass. 491, 204 N.E.2d 504 (1965). See Byse, Opportunity to be Heard in License
Issuance, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 57 (1952); Van Alstyne, The Demise ofthe Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
89. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972):
Certain attributes of "property" interests protected by due process emerge [from an
examination of prior cases]. To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must
have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. . . . It is a
purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a person to
vindicate those claims.
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from
an independent source such as state law. ...
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2. Minor Offenses Excluded
A potentially useful feature of the Minnesota statute is its exclusion
from the statutory direct relationship test of those offenses that are
characterized as misdemeanors for which a jail sentence may not be
imposed. 90 Thus, at least in theory, a misdemeanant whose offense was one
for which jail time could not have been imposed may not be refused
employment even in the presence of a direct relationship between the
offense committed and the employment sought. Limiting the use of even a
direct relationship test is not novel to Minnesota. Florida, for example,
limits legal discrimination of ex-offenders to felons and first-degree
misdemeanants, 9' while New Mexico excludes use of misdemeanor
convictions not involving moral turpitude,92 and Washington appears to
limit such legal discrimination to felons.93
The exclusion of minor offenses reflects a policy decision that the past
criminal activity is too insubstantial to affect an employment or licensing
decision. It may also reflect ajudgment that the excluded offenses are too
minor ever to affect employment competence; in other words, these
offenses may be seen as per se incapable of providing the type of direct
relationship contemplated by the statutory test. Thus, a statutory
exclusion removes a class of cases from administrative discretion and
describes a clear rule prohibiting consideration of the criminal record in
making the decision.94 Depending, of course, on the number of such ex-
misdemeanant applications received, the removal of these cases could
lessen the administrative burden. Moreover, such a per se rule not only
assures administrative compliance, 95 but may well be wise policy if it is true
that administrative discretion, and the time consumed in making case-by-
case decisions, would always result in a finding of no direct relationship.
On the other hand, it can be argued that minor as well as major
offenses should be subject to the direct relationship test since this test
90. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.02 (West Supp. 1979).
91. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.01l(l)(a) (Supp. 1974-78).
92. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-2-3 (1978).
93. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.96A.020 (Supp. 1976). Washington, unfortunately, in limiting its
direct relationship test to ex-felons, left the statute silent with respect to the treatment of
misdemeanants. The section provides that neither public employment nor a license may be denied
solely because of prior conviction of afelony by the applicant. The section also provides that the fact of
an' prior conviction may be considered. Id. Next, the direct relationship test for felonies is set forth.
Certainly the better reading of the statute would interpret the provision as meaning that misdemeanor
convictions may not be the basis on which public employers or state licensing agencies discriminate
against a person, even if a direct relationship under the statutory test would otherwise exist. It is
possible, however, to read the statute as describing a direct relationship test for ex-felons, yet
permitting discrimination against misdemeanants to occur without any relationship necessary to be
shown.
94. This statutory prohibition is made easier to accomplish in Minnesota through the operation
of a parallel provision prohibiting dissemination of, inter alia, records of misdemeanor convictions for
which no jail time could have been imposed. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.04 (West Supp. 1979).
95. Assurance may also, and perhaps better, be achieved by faithful administrative compliance
with the statutory mandate. A per se rule, then, may reflect legislative distrust of administrative
decisionmaking.
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retains the prerogative, even if the need arises only once in a million
applications, to reject for license or employment an ex-offender whose
misdemeanor does, in fact, directly relate to the employment or license
sought. Further, if most of the offenses excluded by these statutes present
situations in which it is clear that no direct relationship can be found, then
there should be no great time or personnel burden in dealing with them. To
the extent that such a burden is actual or perceived, however, the employer
or licensing agency could itself fashion a per se rule by individually listing
or describing by class those misdemeanors (or felonies) that per se form no
direct relationship to the employment or license sought.
A rule fashioned by a particular employer or agency has the virtue of
being specifically tailored to the particular employment or license
requirements and responsibilities and should be less likely than legislation
to be either over or underinclusive. If an employer or licensing agency is
still disinclined to fashion any policy that removes obstacles from ex-
offender hiring or licensing, preferring the administrative burden to a per
se rule that yields the same result, it may still be wise to allow that employer
or licensing agency to handle these matters on a case-by-case basis, for it is
the employer or agency that suffers the burdens of that choice.96
Most of the ex-offender employment discrimination statutes contain
no exclusions for minor offenses, possibly because of a desire to maintain
administrative flexibility. 97 For example, the choice generally to vest a
good deal of discretion in administrators to fashion rules, while structuring
that discretion so that administrative practice conforms to overall
legislative standards, was a major underpinning of the Model Sentencing
and Corrections Act.98 This approach allows agencies, based on expertise
and particular circumstances, to fashion appropriate solutions consistent
with the legislative mandate.99
Whatever the theoretical merits of a statutory exclusion of minor
offenses, the practical success is dependent on the skill exercised in drafting
the statutory exclusions. 00 It is also clear that the exclusions granted by
96. Of course each ex-offender applicant also suffers the burden of the wait. If, in fact, the
employer or agency is acting in bad faith a court in review should be able to correct the problem. It may
also be that, faced with a pattern or practice of avoidance, the legislature may act to establish a per se
rule. But there is no great need to anticipate such agency abuse.
97. It may also be, of course, that the subject was never considered. See note 98 infra.
98. See Perlman & Potuto, The Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Sentencing and
Corrections Act: An Overview, 58 NEB. L. REV. 925 (1978). The minutes of the meetings ofthe Special
Committee to Draft the Model Act indicate that the Special Committee never discussed the specific
question whether minor offenses, however defined, should be excluded from offenses for which
discrimination would be legal when the statutory direct relationship test was met.
99. See generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969).
100. Statutory classifications of offenses do not always represent internally consistent categories
nor, of course, were the classifications created with ex-offender employment in mind. Thus a reference
in an ex-offender employment discrimination statute to a statutory classification, such as Florida's
exclusion of second-degree misdemeanors, may not always exclude the proper offenses and only those.
This may explain New Mexico's exclusion of only those misdemeanors not involving moral turpitude
rather than all offenses classified as misdemeanors.
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statute may not be as broad in some respects as it first appears. Minnesota's
statute provides the best example of this phenomenon.
In Minnesota, as described above, the total exclusion from public
employment or licensing discrimination is limited to "misdemeanors for
which ajail sentence may not be imposed."'0 1 This language refers only to
petty misdemeanors10 2 and basically encompasses minor traffic offenses.
10 3
Thus, in Minnesota, very nearly all those offenses that are commonly
considered criminal, however minor, subject their perpetrators to
employment discrimination if the direct relationship test is satisfied.
By contrast, Florida's statutory exclusion is somewhat broader. Legal
employment discrimination must be based on an offense at least as serious
as a first-degree misdemeanor.10 4 The Florida exclusion relates to second-
degree misdemeanors 105 and all minor traffic violations. 0 6 Since second-
degree misdemeanors carry with them the possibility, upon conviction, of
a maximum sentence of sixty days incarceration, 10 7 a public employer or
licensing agency in Florida is barred by statute from considering
convictions for a greater number of minor offenses than a similarly
situated Minnesota employer or licensing agency.
3. Law Enforcement and Lawyers Exempted
An exemption for law enforcement agencies is quite common in
existing state legislation.'0° The exemption may reflect either an
unwillingness to permit ex-offenders to carry weapons, a necessary part of
the job of at least those employees directly engaged in law enforcement,' 0 9
or, more significantly, a perception that these agencies have a special
interest in the appearance, as well as the reality, of good citizenship and
probity in the fulfillment of their responsibilities.
101. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.02(5) (West Supp. 1979).
102. Id. § 609.0 (4)(a). A misdemeanor is any offense which, upon conviction, may result in up to
90 days incarceration and/or up to a $500 fine. Id. § 609.02(3).
103. See, e.g., id. § 169.09(14). There are a few petty misdemeanors in Minnesota that are not
traffic related. See, e.g., id. § 152.15(2) (possession of a "small amount" of marijuana).
104. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.01 l(1)(a) (West Supp. 1974-78). A first-degree misdemeanor is any
offense which, upon conviction, may result in imprisonment for up to one year. Id. § 775.082 (West
1976).
105. Id. § 775.082.
106. These are classified in Florida as non-criminal violations and do not carry possiblejail time
as a sentence. Id. § 784.011. For examples of such violations, see id. §§ 239.53 (West 1977) (university
traffic regulations); 318.14 (1975).
107. Id. § 775.082.
108. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-61p (West Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.011 (2)(a)
(West Supp. 1974-78); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.09 (West Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-2-5
(1978); N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 750(5) (McKinney Supp. 1979-80). Florida has an additional provision
exempting fire departments from hiring ex-offenders as firemen for four years after release unless the
ex-offender earlier obtains a pardon or restoration of rights. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.01 1(2)(b) (West
Supp. 1974-78).
109. See N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 750(4) (McKinney Supp. 1979-80). Certainly statutes prohibiting
the licensing of ex-offenders for guns are common. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 790.001,790.051,790.23
(West Supp. 1979).
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A statutory exemption of ex-offenders from becoming law enforce-
ment officers will doubtless withstand legal challenge on the ground that it
relates rationally to the objectives and needs of law enforcement officials.
One could at least argue that the sensitive nature of law enforcement work
creates risks that warrant such an exemption and, further, that the general
public has the right to expect that law enforcement officials will set the tone
and standard of lawfulness for the community." 0 In fact, a statutory
disqualification of ex-felons from law enforcement jobs was recently
upheld on the ground that the purpose of the disqualification was "to
assure, insofar as possible, the good character and integrity of peace
officers and to avoid any appearance to members of the public that persons
holding public positions having the status of peace officers may be
untrustworthy.""' A rational purpose was found to exist even though the
statute operated to disqualify ex-felons from jobs such as furniture and
bedding inspectors and health inspectors, for which the carrying of
firearms was unnecessary.'
2
In contrast to a disqualification of ex-offenders for law enforcement
jobs, the statutory exemption provided in the ex-offender employment
statutes at least permits the law enforcement agency the discretion to
employ an ex-o ffender if it so chooses. Moreover, the statutory exemption
gives hope of a narrow construction by the courts. It has already been held
in Florida, for example, that, consistent with the Florida ex-offender
employment discrimination statute, an ex-offender employed as a
correctional guard may carry a weapon even though prohibited by other• i 113 '' .
Florida statutory provisions."' Thus, a law enforcement agency may
voluntarily choose to employ an ex-offender whose offense does not relate
directly to the responsibilities of the employment. Even if an agency has
determined that an ex-offender can never be a law enforcement officer,'
1 4
he might yet be hired, for example, as part of the clerical staff.' '
5
Exemption of the practice of law raises similar-as well as different-
questions. Minnesota is the only state with legislation requiring a direct
relationship in ex-offender employment that exempts the licensing of
110. See P. MAAS, SRPICO (1973).
111. Hetherington v. California State Personnel Bd., 82 Cal. App.3d 582, 590, 147 Cal. Rptr.
300, 305 (1978).
112. Id. at 597, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 309 (Reynoso, J., dissenting).
113. See FLA. Op. ATTm. GEN. 073-229 (June 22, 1973) (interpreting FL. STAT. ANN. §§ 790.001,
790.005, 790.023 (Supp. 1979) in light of ex-offender employment provisions). Despite the position
taken in Florida, the question whether ex-offenders may carry guns when employed as correctional
employees or in other employment requiring guns is also dependent upon whether the offender
committed an offense for which federal law bars him from carrying a gun. See discussion in note 50
supra.
114. For a discussion of just how likely it is that agency or employer discretion will lead to
licensing and employment decisions not mandated by statute, see text accompanying notes 124-25
infra.
115. Ex-offenders may be refused employment even as clerks if the job gives access to
confidential files and information about ongoing investigations.
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lawyers from coverage."16 Again, a case can be made that the special trust
relationship between the legal profession and the general public produces a
special need to control more particularly membership in its ranks. 17 An
additional difficulty is the issue of separation of powers raised by inclusion
of the practice of law within the statutory mandate.
Courts have inherent constitutional power to effect the orderly
administration of justice. The power arises from their very existence and
requires as its source no specific constitutional or legislative provision." 8
This inherent power has traditionally been considered to extend to
regulation of the practice of law, including the qualifications and standards
for admission to practice." 9 Legislative statements affecting admission
standards and qualifications have long been accepted by courts so long as
these statements describe minimum standards to which a court may attach
additional requirements. 120 Thus, whatever the statutory language, a
legislative determination embodied in a statute will not control a court that
finds the statute to be an unconstitutional transgression into a matter that
is within the purview of the judicial branch. Whether a direct relationship
test would be found by courts to intrude unduly on what they see as
reasonable requirements for lawyers will probably vary from state to state.
Some courts may reject the legislative power to impose such a requirement
while acceding to the policy reflected in the legislation.'
21
Notwithstanding the existence of state statutes exempting law
enforcement officials or lawyers from the operation of a direct relationship
test and the expression of policy underlying them, The Special Committee
to Draft the Model Sentencing and Corrections Act opted to exclude
neither group. The Committee's theory was that the direct relationship test
is adequate to exclude those ex-offenders who should properly be barred
from engaging in law enforcement or the practice of law. The Committee
116. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.08 (West Supp. 1979).
117. And, again, at least post-Watergate there is some evidence that, whatever the need, public
faith in the practice of law is not always there. Legislative concern with the practice of law may also be
seen. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 08.08.230 (1975); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6101 (West 1974); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 12-5-108 (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 454.18 (West 1965). Generally, a criminal conviction does
not necessarily mean automatic disqualification. E.g., Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65
Cal.2d 447,421 P.2d 76,55 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966). Nor does the fact a person was not convicted, or even
acquitted, necessarily mean he will not be disqualified. E.g., Spears v. State Bar of California, 211 Cal.
183, 294 P. 697 (1930); Application of Cassidy, 268 App. Div. 282, 51 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1944).
118. See, e.g., Comment, Inherent Power and Administrative Court Reform, 58 MARQUMErE L.
REv. 133, 135-36 (1974). See also Connors, Inherent Power of the Courts-Management Tool or
Rhetorical Weapon?, I JusT. Sys. J. 63 (1974).
119. E.g., In re Mackay, 416 P.2d 823, 836-37 (Alaska 1964), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 890 (1966);
Brydonjack v. State Bar of California, 208 Cal. 439, 447, 281 P. 1018, 1021 (1929); State Bar Ass'n v.
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222,230,140 A.2d 863,868 (1958); In re Opinion ofJustices,
279 Mass. 607, 610, 180 N.E. 725, 727 (1932); In re Fox, 296 So. 2d 701, 703-04 (Miss. 1974); In re
Integration of Nebraska State BarAss'n, 133 Neb. 283,286-87,275 N.W. 265,266-68 (1937); Jenkins v.
Oregon State Bar, 241 Or. 283, 286, 405 P.2d 525, 526 (1965).
120. E.g., InreMackay,416 P.2d 823,828 (Alaska 1964); Inre Lavine,2 Cal.2d 324,329,41 P.2d
161, 163 (1935); In re Opinion of Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180 N.E. 725 (1932).
121. See, e.g., In re Sparks, 267 Ky. 93,97, 101 S.W.2d 194, 196(1936); In re Fox, 296 So. 2d 701,
704 (Miss. 1974).
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felt that, in all instances in which the direct relationship test is not met,
lawyers and law enforcement officials should be on the same footing as
persons in other professions or occupations in providing opportunities for
entry into their ranks. 122 Consistent with this general approach, the Model
Act provides no special criteria for ex-offenders in its provisions describing
employment requirements for correctional employees.
123
It bears emphasizing that the existing law enforcement and lawyer
exemptions do not, typically, prohibit hiring or licensing of ex-offenders
should the agency choose to do so. The wording of the Florida provision is
illustrative: "This section shall not be applicable to any law enforcement
agency. However, nothing herein shall be construed to preclude a law
enforcement agency, in its discretion, from adopting the policy set forth
herein.' 24 Unfortunately, the preservation of choice in the agency will
more than likely mean that the agency will not hire ex-offenders, since it
will probably fall into the common pattern of overrating its own need to
stay "pure."'' 2
5
4. Record Dissemination
A particularly efficacious feature of the Minnesota statute,
126
unfortunately absent from the Model Sentencing and Corrections Act as
well as most of the other existing ex-offender employment discrimination
statutes,1 7 is a statutory attempt to prohibit official dissemination of those
records that have been determined on balance to be more harmful to the
ex-offender applicant 28 than beneficial to those making employment or
122. This is certainly not meant to suggest that the evenhanded application of a direct
relationship test will result in the same hiring or licensing decisions no matter what the occupation or
profession. The responsibilities and duties of the particularjob will, and should, color the employment
or licensing decision resulting from application of a direct relationship test. It is likely, in otherwords,
that many more offenses will be found to relate directly to law enforcementjobs than, for example, to
the practice of barbering.
123. MSCA, supra note 1, § 2-108.
124. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.01 l(2)(a) (West Supp. 1974-78). For other examples, see statutes
cited note 108 supra.
125. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CORRECTIONS, supra note 37, at 91.
126. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.04 (West Supp. 1979).
127. Connecticut and New Mexico are two other states having such a provision. Connecticut
prevents use or dissemination of records of expunged convictions and arrest records not followed by
convictions. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-61o(c) (West Supp. 1979). New Mexico prohibits use or
dissemination of arrest records not followed by convictions and records of misdemeanor convictions
not involving moral turpitude. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-2-3 (1978). Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2947
(West Supp. 1979) (misdemeanor to communicate information with intent to deprive ex-offender of
employment opportunity). Maryland by regulation permits private employer access to arrest records
only when otherwise authorized by statute, ordinance, executive or court order, and to conviction
records in those cases in which there is significant employment sensitivity or a public safety interest at
stake. LEAA, PRIVACY AND SECURITY OF CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION: AN ANALYSIS OF PRIVACY
INTERESTS 58-59 (1978). See generally 28 C.F.R. §§ 20.20 and 20.33 (1978) (criminal history record
information organization and dissemination). See also Note, The Effect of Expungement on a
Criminal Conviction, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 127, 140 (1967).
128. Those records are also harmful to the societal interest in encouraging him to obtain and
retain gainful employment. See Criminal Justice Information and Protection and Privacy Act of 1975:
Hearings on S. 2008 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., I st Sess. 235 (1975) (statement of A. Neier, Executive Director, American Civil
Liberties Union).
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licensing decisions. Minnesota prohibits distribution for employment or
licensing purposes of those records of misdemeanor convictions for which
no jail sentence can be imposed, of arrests not followed by convictions,
and of expunged convictions. 129 The misdemeanor conviction records
relate, of course, to the Minnesota exclusion of these offenses from
employer or agency consideration for purposes of a direct relationship test.
In a broader sense, expunged convictions represent a similar policy choice.
Certainly a very efficient and successful method of assuring the
effectuation of that policy choice is merely to prevent the dissemination of
those records that are statutorily deemed not relevant to the employment
or licensing decision. If, after all, the employer or licensing agency does not
know that the applicant committed the offense, the employer or agency
cannot consider the offense in making the employment or licensing
decision." 0
Arrest records not followed by convictions seem to present another
clear case for a dissemination prohibition' because use of such records is
inconsistent with a presumption of innocence. 32 The prohibition on
dissemination of such records, however, does not clarify what Minnesota's
policy is with respect to arrest records in pending cases.1 3 It may be that
the prohibition was intended to cover even these arrest records, but there is
good reason to permit arrest record dissemination at least for a period of
time after the arrest. First, if the offense charged would meet the direct
relationship test, then the arrest record, particularly if followed by a
prosecution, raises some legitimate concern on the part of the employer or
licensing agency. Second, at least during the pendency of a trial, the
employer or agency may well have substantial interest in avoiding both the
impact of adverse publicity and the concern that the employee or licensee's
time and attention will be directed toward the trial rather than the
employment.1
3 4
129. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.04 (West Supp. 1979).
130. This, of course, is the policy embodied in expungement statutes. See text accompanying
notes 44-46 supra.
131. An argument can be made that arrest records not followed by conviction should
nonetheless be disseminated. Minor misdemeanors, after all, are excluded because of a legislative
determination and expunged records are the result of a court record predicated on a statutory
standard. The exercise of prosecutorial discretion, by contrast, is not usually subject to review on the
record nor predicated upon a specifically delineated public standard.
132. After a period of time arrest records should be neither disseminated nor used, except for law
enforcement purposes, even in cases in which, in a practical sense, the presumption of innocence is
clearly rebuttable. Consider a case in which no conviction followed the arrest presumably because of
suppression of evidence based on an unconstitutional search and seizure. First, the exclusion policy
should cover the arrest record because there is no certainty that a conviction would have resulted even if
the evidence had not been suppressed. Second, there is no practical way to exclude those cases in which
innocence is truly in doubt from all others, and a blanket approach should be in favor of no record
dissemination or use.
133. This is likewise true of Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §4-61o(c) (West Supp. 1979),
and New Mexico. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-2-3 (1978).
134. This problem could admittedly also result in the case of a person already employed or
licensed who is subsequently arrested and charged with an offense. When a direct relationship is
present, the agency or employer should be able to suspend the license or employment for a period of
time or until final disposition. See Skoler, Accusation of Crime and Job Retention: A Cooling Off
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On the other hand, there must be a limit set on the period of time
during which arrest records not followed by a conviction may be
disseminated to members of the public. It is not enough to permit
dissemination so long as the case is still pending since there is often no
formal disposition of a case. For state agencies receiving federal funds to
develop or maintain manual or automated data storage operations, the
general rule is that the agency may not disseminate arrest information un-
less the case is in active process or less than one year has elapsed from the
arrest. 135 Some such time limit is necessary to protect the arrestee from
discrimination which could otherwise continue even though his case is no
longer active.
5. What About Private Employers?
Unlike the Model Sentencing and Corrections Act, most of the
existing ex-offender employment discrimination legislation suffers from a
major defect: the legislation is restricted in impact to licensing and public
employment 36 and leaves the private employer free to make whatever
employment decisions he chooses. The Model Act, on the other hand,
covers not only private employers137 but unions and professional and
vocational schools. 138 These latter groups are included within the mandate
of the Act because their activities can affect substantially the employment
opportunities available to ex-offenders. The statutes of at least three states,
New York, 39 Wisconsin, 14  and Hawaii, 14 1 presently cover private
Period for Arrested Employees, 4 DAYTON L. REV. 283, 285-86 (1979). In the case of a person already
employed or licensed, however, it may be difficult for the agency or employer to learn of the arrest since
employees or licensees do not continually fill out employment questionnaires that might uncover a
pending case against the employee or licensee.
135. 28 C.F.R. § 20.33 (1979). The regulations were adopted by the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration (LEAA) pursuant to the Federal Crime Control Act of 1973,42 U.S.C. § 3701 (1976).
The Act governs information systems receiving federal funds. 28 C.F.R. § 20.20 (1978). See CoLo. REV.
STAT. § 24-72-308(6) (Supp. 1978) (dissemination permitted for two years after arrest).
The federal regulations do not preclude resort to public records, such as police blotters, or public
proceedings. 28 C.F.R. § 20.20 (1979). Under the proposed regulations, covered records would have
had to be maintained chronologically. Proposed LEAA Admin. Regs., 40 FED. REG. 22114 (1975)
(codified in 28 C.F.R. 20). Later direct access would thus have been more difficult because it would have
required knowledge of a specific time period. See Nat'l L.J., June 18, 1979, at 31, col. 2. See also New
Bedford Standard-Times Pub. Co. v. Clerk of the Third Dist., 387 N.E.2d 110 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1979).
The proposed regulation governing chronological recordkeeping was not adopted.
The LEAA adopted rules governing arrest records not followed by convictions. It could be argued
that even arrest records followed by convictions should not be disseminated. The arrest record, after
all, may describe an offense for which the offender, for a variety of reasons including a plea bargain, is
not convicted.
136. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-61n -4-61r (West Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 112.011 (Supp. 1974-78); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 364.01 -364.10 (West Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 9.96A.010 -9.96A.050 (Supp. 1976). See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 11:10-6.1 (West 1976).
137. MSCA, supra note 1, § 4-1005(b)(1). The section defines an employer by tracking the size
and duration requirements of the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 2,42
U.S.C. § 2000e.
138. MSCA supra note 1, § 4-1005(b)(2), (3).
139. N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 750 (McKinney Supp. 1979-80).
140. WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31, 111.32 (West 1974 and Supp. 1979-80).
141. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 378-2 (1976).
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employers; Hawaii also covers both unions and employment agencies142
while Wisconsin covers unions and education, health, and social welfare
concerns as they relate to conditions of employment.
43
Although it can be argued that a state should properly limit its
prohibition of ex-offender employment discrimination to state employ-
ment and licensing, such a limitation places insufficient weight on the
benefits of gainful employment that accrue both to the ex-offender and
society. 44 Private employers are certainly prohibited from engaging in
other types of employment discrimination. 4  There seems to be no
particular harm in adding ex-offenders to that list of groups if employment
can be refused when a direct relationship exists between the offense
committed and the employment sought.
To avoid a possible caseload burden on the courts, claims of ex-
offender employment discrimination by private employers can be handled
by procedures already established to treat other claims of employment
discrimination. The Model Sentencing and Corrections Act, as well as the
Hawaii and New York statutes, do handle these claims in this manner.146
The Model Act, for example, provides that the state's Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission "has jurisdiction over ex-offender discrimina-
tion complaints in a like manner with its jurisdiction over other allegations
of discrimination."' 147 The Model Act was patterned after the statutory
scheme described in the Hawaii act. 48 In New York these discrimination
claims are referred for determination to the Division of Human Rights.
49
D. Direct Relationship Test: When Is It Met?
Enactment of ex-offender employment discrimination provisions
such as those of the Model Act and establishment of procedures to handle
complaints arising under such a statute is a necessary first step in providing
ex-offender employment. As described above, the Model Act and most of
the state statutes allow discrimination only if a direct relationship 5 ° exists
between the offense committed and the employment or license sought.' 5'
142. Id. § 378-1.
143. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.32 (West 1974 and Supp. 1979-80).
144. See cases and authorities cited in note 12 supra.
145. See, e.g., The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
146. In Wisconsin employment discrimination of ex-offenders is included within the general
provisions of the Wisconsin Fair Employment statute. WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31, 111.32 (West 1974
and Supp. 1979-80).
147. MSCA, supra note 1, § 4-1005(d).
148. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 378-1 to 378-10 (1976).
149. N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 755 (2) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
150. MSCA, supra note 1, § 1005(c); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.01 1(1)(a) (West Supp. 1974-78);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.03 (West Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 11:10-6.1 (West 1976); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 28-2-I to 2-6 (1976); N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 752 (McKinneySupp. 1979-80) (direct relationship
or "unreasonable risk to property or to the safety or welfare" of specific individuals or the general
public); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.96A.020 (Supp. 1976). Connecticut's statutory standard is somewhat
broader. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 41-6 10 (West Supp. 1979) (applicant "not suitable" based on time
since conviction or release, rehabilitation shown, and nature of crime and its relationship to the
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Thus, the determination whether a direct relationship exists is crucial. Yet
several of the statutory definitions in existing legislation are either meager
or nonexistent, providing no specific standard by which the initial
employment or licensing decision can be made and, in turn, no specific
standard by which a court can review an adverse decision to assure
compliance with the legislative policy. Washington and Florida, for
example, merely state that the direct relationship test is to be controlling
5 2
without any indication of what the test means or how to apply it. Hawaii's
statutory test is "substantial relationship," but, again, there is nothing in
the statute that defines just what a substantial relationship is or how it is to
be found.'
Connecticut does provide some language with respect to when
employment discrimination is permitted against ex-offenders, but the
statutory language does not really provide guidelines for an employer or
licensing agency with respect to how the determination is to be made; it
merely directs consideration of the nature of the offense and its
relationship to the employment or license sought, the degree of
rehabilitation shown, and the time elapsed since conviction or release.
54
Listing these factors in the statute does eliminate other factors from
consideration, but the factors are so broadly stated that they leave great
room for maneuverability and probably obviate any need for additional
factors. Minnesota provides no guidelines regarding what is meant by a
direct relationship, but it does provide that even when a direct relationship
exists, evidence of rehabilitation may outweigh the direct relationship.' 5
New York provides the longest list of factors to be considered in applying a
direct relationship test. These factors are: (1) New York's public policy in
favor of hiring ex-offenders; (2) the requirements of the particular
employment sought). Hawaii uses different language but its standard seems similar to "direct
relationship." HAWAII REV. STAT. § 378(2) (1976) ("substantial relationship to the functions and
responsibilities of the prospective or continued employment"). New Jersey, whose statute relates
exclusively to civil service employment, uses an "adverse" relationship test.
New Mexico, although applying a direct relationship test, nonetheless permits discrimination in
the absence of a direct relationship if a determination is made that the ex-offender is not sufficiently
rehabilitated. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-24 (1978). In this case the ex-offender must receive the reasons in
writing for the adverse decision. Id. The statute also provides that rehabilitation is presumed upon
completion of probation or parole supervision or three years "clean time" after final discharge. Id.
151. For a list of the statutes that require use of a direct relationship test or some equivalent, see
note 150 supra. There is no test of any kind mentioned in Wisconsin's fair employment statute. The
statute was amended to include discrimination based solely on an arrest or conviction record. Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31, 111.32 (West Supp. 1979-80). The amendment is recent and there are no cases
clarifying the scope of prohibited ex-offender discrimination in Wisconsin. Although no direct
relationship test is included, practically speaking the Wisconsin statutory language, prohibiting
discrimination "solely because" of an arrest or conviction record, should produce the same statutory
interpretation and results as does the direct relationship test.
152. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.01 l(1) (West Supp. 1974-78); WASH. REV. CODE§9.96A.020(Supp.
1976).
153. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 378(2) (1976).
154. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-61 o(a) (West Supp. 1979). New Jersey has a similar statutory
scheme. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 11:10-6.1 (West 1976).
155. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.03 (West Supp. 1979).
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employment sought; (3) the impact of the offense on job performance; (4)
the time elapsed since commission of the offense; (5) the seriousness of the
offense; (6) any evidence of rehabilitation; and (7) evidence going to
employer interest and public safety and welfare. 156 Although the list of
factors is long, it is, once again, not very specific in terms of the balancing
that is required to determine whether a direct relationship exists.
The Model Sentencing and Corrections Act does provide detailed and
directed guidelines for application of the direct relationship test. The
Model Act requires evaluation of:
(1) whether the occupation, profession, or educational endeavor
provides an opportunity for the commission of similar offenses;
(2) whether the circumstances leading to the offense will recur;
(3) whether the person has committed other offenses since the
conviction or his conduct since conviction makes it likely that he will commit
other offenses;
(4) whether the person seeks to establish or maintain a relationship
with an individual or organization with which his victim is associated or was
associated at the time of the offense; and
(5) the time elapsed since release.157
The first two factors listed relate directly to consideration of the offense
that was committed and the likelihood that the job or educational
opportunity will provide circumstances or opportunities similar to those
that led to the commission of that offense in the first place. These two
factors are the heart of the direct relationship test and, whatever else the
test could or should cover, it certainly covers these factors. Factors (1) and
(2), then, assure that a bank need not hire a convicted bank embezzler nor
need it hire an embezzler of any kind. There can be little argument that a
legislative intent in establishing a direct relationship test was to permit
these and similar decisions. The bank surely has an interest, if it chooses to
assert it, in keeping an embezzler away. These first two factors will
probably also permit decisions not to employ or license in situations in
which the nexus between offense and employment is not quite so close. An
offender who reacted to a pressure-filled job by a demonstration of
assualtive behavior at work, for example, may properly be refused
employment not only at that job but at other jobs creating similar
pressures. Of use to that ex-offender would be evidence that his emotional
state, changed by circumstances or psychiatric assistance, has improved
sufficiently enough that he will not react to pressure as he did previously.
Factor (3), dealing with the subsequent commission of other offenses,
relates less directly to a relationship between the primary offense in
question and the employment, license, or educational opportunity sought.
If not outweighed by the other factors, it operates to permit an employer to
refuse to hire a repetitive offender even if none of the prior offenses are
156. N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 753 (McKinney Supp. 1979-80).
157. MSCA, supra note 1, § 4-1005(c).
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related to the requirements of thejob the ex-offender seeks. This result can
be explained in part on the ground that job performance, or at least the
employer's confidence in that performance, may be affected. The repeat
offender's attention may be directed to the commission of other offenses,
and, if he is charged with commission of another offense, his time on the
job may be lessened by court appearances, lawyer conferences, and if
convicted, subsequent incarceration. In part, a decision adverse to the
repetitive ex-offender can also be explained as a recognition of legitimate
employer interest both in his reputation in the community and in his faith
in the reliability and stability of his work force. Although such results may
at times be justified, the courts should be wary of too broad an
interpretation of the scope of the authority to reject repetitive ex-offenders.
Misuse of factor (3) could easily obviate much of the good to be achieved
by an ex-offender employment discrimination statute.
Factor (4) reflects the employer's interest in refusing to rehire
someone whose past offense has already produced an adverse effect on the
employment relationship. Factor (4) thus protects the right of an employer
to refuse to rehire the office troublemaker whose trouble was commission
of a criminal offense for which he was prosecuted and convicted. In the
case of theft of company property, the employer may have been the victim
of the prior offense. In other cases the victim may have been another
employee who was assaulted by the ex-offender. In either event, factor (4)
makes express an employer's right to refuse to rehire the ex-offender.
Factor (4) is also intended to cover criminal conduct that occurred off
company property, at least in those circumstances in which the original
employment relationship is affected. For example, an employee who rapes
another employee, after work hours and off the premises, is properly one
that an employer could decide not to rehire. Factor (4), then, represents
another reflection of an employer's legitimate interest in providing a
pleasant and comfortable employment atmosphere and stable working
relationships for himself and his employees. By recognizing such interests,
factor (4) gives weight to the victim's interests 58 and balances against them
both the personal employment interests of the ex-offender and the societal
interest in providing employment to ex-offenders. If, as is entirely likely,
the victim the ex-offender employee assaulted on the job and the victim he
raped off the job would choose not to be employed where the ex-offender is
employed, the Act permits the employer to continue the victim in his
employ by refusing to hire the ex-offender. This solution is entirely
reasonable.
The four factors described above provide criteria for determining that
a direct relationship exists. Their presence leads to a decision not to
158. Factor (4), in its recognition of victims' interests, is consistent with a recognition of victims'
interests reflected variously throughout the Model Act. E.g., §§ 3-205 (presentence reports); 3-207
(sentencing hearing); 3-602 (restitution); and all of Article 5. There is today a growing awareness and
attempt to deal with victims' interests. See, e.g., MSCA, supra note I, Art. 5, Prefatory Note.
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employ or license, or to fire or revoke a license. These factors detail the
considerations to be undertaken in making a decision adverse to the ex-
offender. The thrust of factor (5), however, in its directive to consider time
elapsed since release, points toward a decision favorable to the ex-
offender. In other words, the longer the time elapsed, the less important
become factors (1) through (4). Thus, a just-released three-time offender,
even one who for the first time has employable skills to offer, might be
refused employment because under factor (3) he is seen as likely to
recidivate. If such a decision were upheld as an acceptable exercise of
discretion on these facts, 159 most would agree that the decision would be
much less acceptable two years later if the ex-offender is still "clean."
There is much to be said, in fact, for a provision in the ex-offender
employment discrimination statutes that puts a time limit on the use of a
conviction when no subsequent offenses are committed. Indeed, the
existing Washington statute provides such a time limit. 60 It is quite
reasonable to take the policy position, as Washington does, that a recent
clean history is a more reliable predictor of recidivism than an old criminal
record. 16' An earlier draft version of the Model Act set five clean years
from release as the time after which a criminal conviction would no longer
be considered. This is a sound legislative policy decision, at least as sound
as that directing the expungement of records. But, whether the statute
provides such an internal laches provision, it is still clear that the older the
record the less likely that it can legitimately be the basis for a finding of a
direct relationship leading to a refusal to license or hire.
Even an enumeration of the factors to be considered in applying a
direct relationship test such as that found in the Model Act leaves a good
deal of discretion to the decisionmaker. This is both good and necessary
since legislation should not and cannot replace the decisionmaking
function in a particular fact situation-legislatures need only set guidelines
specific enough to structure appropriately the exercise of discretion, as was
done in the Model Act. Those guidelines then serve a dual function. They
dictate the parameters within the bounds of which the exercise of
discretion occurs, and they provide a clear and specific standard against
which a reviewing court may measure and judge the exercise of discretion.
Moreover, the Model Act leaves the employer (or licensing agency or
labor union or school) with not only the specific fact determination,
consistent with the factors delineated in the statute, but also with the power
to make use of other, unlisted factors if they are consistent with the policy
159. This is not to suggest that such a decision would be the most reasonable. It could be argued
that the three-time offender is as much in need of employment as anyone else and that gainful
employment could prevent the recidivism (and might, in fact, have prevented the occurrence of his
second or third offense).
160. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.96A.020 (Supp. 1976).
161. This is also true merely because the older a person is the less likely he is to commit an
offense. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
S r, rEs 187. Table 307 (99th ed. 1978) (56.3% of all arrestees under age 24).
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embodied in the direct relationship test and with the five enumerated
factors. The factors listed-those that must be considered-should, of
course, assist in determining whether the additional factor used is
reasonable and appropriate; thus, the listed factors will affect the number
and scope of appropriate additional factors.
It should be reemphasized that the factors listed in the Model Act are
intended not to be considered individually and to be individually decisive,
but to be weighed one against the other in making a determination. Thus,
the fact that the employment sought provides circumstances similar to
those that produced the original offense (the pressure-filled job under
which the assaultive behavior initially occurred) may well be outweighed
by the ex-offender's exemplary conduct since his release one year ago, 162 or
the fact that he is seeking a totally new employment situation with different
co-workers.163 The existence in a particular case of one or more of the first
four factors, then, is not dispositive. Furthermore, as with the lawyer and
law enforcement agency exemptions described earlier, nothing in the
Model Act prevents an employer or licensing agency from deciding to
provide the license or employment even in the face of what is fairly believed
to be all four factors. Providing a chance to an employable ex-offender is,
after all, what the ex-offender employment discrimination statutes are all
about.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ex-offenders who find gainful employment after release are less likely
to recidivate than those who do not. Correctional programs aimed at
teaching employable skills and instilling good work habits can do their
part-a substantial part-to assure that ex-offenders have employable
skills, but these programs cannot assure the availability of employment
opportunities upon release. The statutory retention of rights of offenders,
or restoration of rights of ex-offenders, sets the framework. Ex-offender
employment discrimination statutes can go a long way toward completing
the picture.
162. This is either incorporated under factor (3) or is an additional factor that reasonably should
be considered.
163. MSCA, supra note 1, § 1005(c)(4).
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